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NOTES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS-RECENT DECISIONS-The frequent occurrence of the first
amendment as a defense in recent cases bids fair to establish it as
the most popular as well as the most versatile of the constitutional
guaranties, the younger but lustier fourteenth amendment, of course,
excepted. Whether its presence in a most heterogeneous aggregation
of decisions is due to the decreasing vogue of the fourteenth amend-
ment or can be ascribed to its own inherent potentialities, must
be a matter of conjecture. Obviously, however, the term "freedom
of speech . . ." can be used to cloak a multitude of social sins,
and a precise delimitation of its meaning is desirable.
(17o)
NOTES
Certain things seem patent. Liberty of the press is not syn-
onymous with license. "The constitutional provision is not a refuge
for inalicous slanderers and libelers."' Nor can it be interposed to
defeat the operation of a Federal statute against the dissemination
of obscene matter.2 It does not prevent a court from punishing
for contempt, whether committed within or without its presence. .
A court may enjoin the publication of libellous matter or of articles
intended to obstruct justice.4  But whether under the wording of
some of the state statutes, prevention instead of punishment of
the unlawful speeh or publication is constitutional, is exceedingly
doubtful.5 Some of the courts have taken the position that under
a constitution providing that persons exercising liberty of speech
or of the press shall be responsible for an abuse of that liberty,
without specifying what shall constitute an abuse, the legality of
any speech is to be determined by common law principles or by
statutory declaration of the police power.6
The constitutional provision has been invoked in cases less
obviously within its intendment. The Civil Service "Act of 1876,
which restricted the political activities of government officeholders,
was attacked as contrary to the amendment. The act was upheld
by a majority of the court, but the dissenting opinion of Justice
Bradley to the effect that, "Neither men's mouths nor their purses
can be constitutionally tied up in this way," foreshadowed the con-
flict in recent decisions upon similar questions.!
Statutes requiring the procurement of a license for theatrical
performances have been held not to violate the constitutional pro-
vision.8 In the large number of cases which contested the censor-
ship of motion pictures, the first amendment was relied on as a
defense, but the courts have been reluctant to extend the words
"speech" and "press" beyond their usual meanings.9 Lawyers who
'McDougal v. Sheridan, 128 Pa. 954 (1913); Hyde v. State, 159 Wis.
65 (1915).
'Tyonues Publishing Co. et al. v. U. S, 21! Fed. 385 (19T4); Clark
el al., v. U. S., 211 Fed. 916 (x914).
'In re Fite, ri Ga. App. 665 (1912); Its re Egan, 123 N. W. 478 (S. Dak.
,9o9).
'U. S. v. Toledo Newspaper Co., 220 Fed. 458 (zgrS).
'Ex Parte Heffron, 162 S. W. 652 (1914).
'32 L R. A. 829; 34 L. R. A., N. S. 482.
'Ex Parte Curtis, xo6 U. S. 371 (1882).
' Com. v" McGann, 213 Mass. 213 (1913).
'Mutual Film Corporation v. City of Chicago et al., 224 Fed. 1o (i915);
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna, said: "The first impulse
of the mind is to reject the contention (i. e., that motion pictures came
within the protection of the amendment). We immediately feel that the
argument is wrong or strained which extends the guarantees of free opinion
and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards
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have been disbarred for indiscreet and unprofessional utterances,
and physicians whose licenses have been revoked for similar reasons,
have fallen back upon their constitutional rights as a last resort,
but without success. 10 In an anomolous and extraordinary case
a member of a social club who had been exptlled for the publica-
tion of an article reflecting upon his fellow-members, asked to be
reinstated by judicial decree by virtue of the constitutional guar-
antee."
Within the last few years two large classes of cases have arisen
in which "freedom of speech . . ." is a very mooted phrase.
The first arises out of the struggles of capital and labor. Here
vagueness and inconsistency are the rule rather than the exception,
with very marked differences in the attitude of the courts of the
various sections of the country.2 \'here it was urged that a statute
requiring a corporation to give a discharged employee the reason
for his discharge, was unconstitutional, the court, summarily dis-
missed the objection with these words:'
"It does not take away the right of free speech or right to
make, print or publish one's own opinion. It does require under
certain conditions that an employer shall speak the truth in regard
to the ex-employee."
The second class of cases in which the constitutional'amend-
ment figures strongly relates to that large and increasing body of
legislation which seeks to control the conduct of elections, limit
the expenses of candidates, and keep certain offices without the
arena of politics. Here the first amendment has proved to be a
serious obstacle to what is admittedly salutary and progressive legis-
lation. 1" Some of the courts, in whole-hearted sympathy with these
of our cities and towns, and which regards them as emblems of public
safety . . . and which seeks to bring motion pictures into practical and
legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion. It cannot be put
out of view that the 'exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit like other spectacles, not to be*
regarded nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think,
as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."
" People v. Apfelbaum, 251 11. x8 (i9tx).
"Barry v. The Players, 13o N. Y. S. 701 (1911). The court said, inter
alia: "If no member of a social club could be expelled for any act which he
had a constitutional right to commit, no matter how unpardonable such act
might be from a social standpoint or from the standpoint of a particular
social organization, then manifestly it would be impossible to preserve the
continued existence of organizations, the breath of whose life is congeniality
and harmony in respect to matters wholly unsusceptible of measurement or
control by such instruments as constitutions and laws."
Ex Parte Heffron, supra.
St. Louis Southwestern Rwy. Co. v. Hixon, 126 S. W. 338 (Tex. 19o9);
Affd. in 162 S. AV. 383 (Tex. 7913).
"In State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. x (*909), a divided court helal unconstitu-
tional a statute which provided that "candidates for judicial and educational
NOTES
acts, have confined the amendment wiihin very narrow limits.
Where the constitutionality of a statute which forbade a candidate
from expending in his election campaign more than fifteen per cent.
of the yearly salary of the aspired office, was involved, the court
said :"
"It is argued that said provisions are contrary to the pro-
visions of Sec. 9 of Art. i of our state constitution, which is as
follows: 'Every person may freely speak, write or publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' 'There
is nothing in that contention.
"The provisions of the primary election law in regard to the
expenditures of a person aiding or promoting his nomination for
an office in no manner conflict with said provisions of the constitt-
tion. That law does not attempt to prevent a candidate from
freely 18 speaking, writing and publishing his views on all subjects."
A very recent case 17 adopts an essentially dissimilar point
of view. A statute of the state forbade one, not a candidate nor
a committeeman, from spending money outside his own county
for political purposes. A majority of the court held that the statute
infringed the constitutional freedom of the press, giving the term
its broadest meaning.18 The dissenting opinion, in its desire to
effectuate the admirable aim of the act, would fritter away the sub-
stantial protection of the constitutional provision by "subordinating
it to the great leading purpose for which constitutional governments
have been established-to form a more perfect government ....
to promote the general welfare . . ." Such an interpretation of
the first amendment, while permitting the more speedy adoption of
needful legislation after the manner of the Idaho court, would
emasculate the term "freedom of speech."
offices shall not be nominated, indorsed, recommended, censured, criticised
or referred to in any matter by any political party or any political convention
or primary." So, also, in Ex Parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (igo8), the court
held unconstitutional a statute making criminal the publication by a civic
league of any report concerning candidates for office without stating in full
the facts upon which the report is based and the names and addresses of all
persons furnishing the information.
" Adams v. Lansdon, 18 Idaho 483 (i91o).
"The italics are the writer's.
"State v. Pierce, 158 Wis. 696 (igx6). The court, speaking 'through
C. J. Winslow, said: "The defendant being a citizen of Roth County, spent
money in Dane County, gathering facts concerning governmental affairs and
in communicating those facts to the people of the state at large with the
intent of influencing the voting at an approaching election. This cannot be
made a criminal act while the constitutional guaranties of speech and free-
dom of the press remain as they now are."
" Mr. Justice Siebecker, saying, inter alia: "'Vhere the abuse of the
purity of elections begins, through whatever means it might be accomplished,
liberty of speech and press must end. for without such a check, this right
could be made a most effective instrument of mischief."
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It is submitted that the attitude of the majority of the Wis-
consin court, is the more tolerant and the more wholesome. Though
the purpose of the contested law be most praiseworthy, though it
express the keen desires of a progressive community, the remon-
strant who relies upon the constitution is entitled to a respectful
hearing.
With the struggle between capital and labor growing more
acrimonious, and with the increase of reform legislation of doubt-
ful constitutionality, the future looms bright for the first amend-
ment.
B.W.
JUDGMENTS-RELIEF IN EQUITY AGAINST JUDGMENTS AT LAW
-The power of equity to relieve against judgments at law when
fraudulently obtained or where some strong natural equity can be
alleged 'against them, although it is at the present day so firmly
established, was violently resisted by the common law lawyers and
judges. Fraud being the original attaching point of equity juris-
diction, it was natural that one of the very first subjects to engage
the attention of the English chancellors was that of equitable inter-
ference with a judgment of a law court obtained by fraud. The
question whether a court of equity could give relief for or against a
judgm6nt at common law was the subject of the famous controversy
in the reign of James I, which was conducted principally by Lord
Coke against, and by Lord Ellesmere in favor of, the chancery juris-
diction, and which was finally decided in favor of the latter., From
that time down to this day the jurisdiction has been repeatedly
exercised by courts of equity and it remains only to consider under
what circumstances they will act and what is the nature of. the
relief.
At the outset it is well to remember that judgments are not
reversed or vacated in equity. The adjudications at law are not
overhauled or re-examined. It is to the party himself that the
energies of the court of equity are directed and its remedial power
is exercised by placing restraint upon -his usual right to follow up
his judgment by the appropriate process for its collection. Equity
therefore acts on the person in this, as in all matters; and while it
will enjoin the enforcement of a judgment in a proper case, it will
not interfere with the judgment itself.2 Cases sometimes arise
"where the right to move for a new trial at law was lost in conse-
quence of some of the circumstances which equity always regards
'I Story's Equity, Sec. 5T.
2Harding v. Fiske, 12 N. Y. Supp. 139 I89o) ; Justice v. Scott, 39 N. C.
io8 (T845). But equity may reform a judgment, by the addition of something
omitted through mistake, when due cause therefor is shown, Hamburg Ins.
Co. v. Pelzer Co., 76 Fed. 479 (1896).
as sufficient warrant for its interference. The language employed
in the decisions with respect to the granting of new trials in equifty
in such cases, or the compelling of a party to submit to a new trial,
is often misleading, in that it produces the impression that the ver-
dict and judgment at law are vacated and set aside and the case
there taken up .and retried. Nothing of-the kind occurs. The court
of equity, when it grants relief, does not vacate or otherwise dis-
turb the judgment at law.3  If it finds that with respect to some
issues presented in the action at law, the complainant ought not to
be concluded by the judgment in that action, and that such issues
ought to be tried anew, it will require the defendant to submit to
the re-trial thereof.4  But this re-trial does not take place in the
original action at law. The chancery court merely orders the issue
to be tried as other issues out of chancery are tried, enjoining
enforcement of the judgment during the meantime, and when so
tried the result is certified to it for its final action.
The power which the law courts have assumed in modem times
in controlling their own judgments and in opening and vacating
judgments upon equitable grounds,e although it does not affect
the concurrent jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant relief, has,
nevertheless, lessened the number of odcasions upon which equity
will interfere with proceedings at law.7 For on the principle that
equity will not grant relief where there is an adequate remedy at
law, it is generally held that equitable relief will not be given if the
party can be equally well relieved by motion or other proceeding
in the original action.8 So while courts of equity have uniformly
refused their aid in all cases where their action would involve either
the usurpation of appellate jurisdiction or the.granting of a second
opportunity of presenting a cause upcn the merits, they have, on
the other hand, uniformly extended their relief to two well defined
Knifong v. Hendricks, 2 Grat. 2r2 (Va. 1845) ; Givens' Appeal, 121 Pa.
S26 (x888).
'Equity will not set aside a judgment at law on grounds which were
presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial and held insufficient.
Telford v. Brinkerhoff, 163 Ill. 439 (i896); Hendrickson v. Bradley, 85 Fed.
5o8 (1898).
'Wynne v. Newman, 75 Va. 8xi (i88i).
'In Pennsylvania a judgment remains within the control of the common
law court during the term, and ends with the term. Any further control is
exercised by the same court vested with equitable powers and applying
equitable principles. Boyd v. Kirch, 234 Pa. 432 (912); Jaffe v. Cooperman,
231 Pa. 237 (19I1).
'Metcalf v. Williams, io4 U. S. 93 (i8&i); Froebrich v, Lane, 45 Ore.
13 (9o4).
* Dilworth Co. v. Kidney, 43 Pa. Super. 625 (tgto) ; Hussey v. Gourley,
153 I1. App. 5o (i9w), Clark v. Bayonne B. E., -6 N. J. Eq. 326 (go_);
Flanagan v. McXutt, i13 NX. Y. Supp. 42 (19o8).
'Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 488.
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classes of cases, with the objective that no man should retain an
unconscionable- advantage procured in a court of law through his
own fraud, or through some excusable mistake or unavoidable acci-
dent on the part of his adversary. The relief of equity in such
cases is grounded in the fact that a party could not, for certain
reasons, successfully prosecute his claim nor make his defense in
the original action. Those reasons naturally form the division oi
the two classes: first, all those cases in which a defense or prosecu-
tion could not be made on account of the fraud or act of the adver-
sary; second, all those cases where a party failed to present his
side of the controversy because of somfe unavoidable accident.9
In both these classes of cases courts of equity have undoubted
jurisdiction to grant relief against a judgment at law under many
and different circumstances which we will not here discuss. How-
ever, the important point to observe is that in either class of case,
the power of equity to interfere is founded, not alone upon the
presence of fraud in the one case or of unavoidable accident in
the other, but upon the additional presence of some original ground
of equitable relief, namely, the injustice of the judgment itself.
Equity will not grant relief against judgments entered in a court of
law, without some showing of ground for equitable relief-without
some showing that the judgment itself is unjust or inequitable.10
There must be something inherently wrong in the judgment, and
the burden rests upon the complaining party to impeach it. He
must not only show that the judgment is unconscionable and inequi-
table, that it was procured by fraud, was the result of accident or
mistake, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with any fault
or negligence on his part, 1 but it must be such a judgment as a
court of equity, in good conscience, will not permit to be enforced
against the complaining party. Mere technical errors, which do
not go to the merits of the controversy, committed by the law
court on ihe trial, will not call for the interference of a court of
equity. The complainant must allege not only the fraud or the
accident, but must set forth a good and meritorious defense to
the claim on which the judgment was rendered, by which it. is
reasonably made to appear that the result would be other or dif-
ferent than that already reached, in the event of a retrial.
12
A recent decision in Iowa'affords an excellent illustration of
this.1 3 A judgment had been rendered against the defendant in
the lower court and within thirty days from its rendition he had
requested the official shorthand reporter to certify the testimony
2 Johnson v. Branch, 48 Ark. 535 (i886) ; Galbraith v. Barnard, 21 Ore.
67 (891).
"Hol'ster v. Sobra, .264 111. s35 (T914).
"Hollister v. White v. Crow, i1io U. S. i83; Combs v. Hamlin Oil Co.,
58 Ill. App. 123 (1895).
'Bingham v. Clarke, 159 N. W. 172 (Iowa 1916).
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in accordance with the statutory requirement where an appeal was
desired. This the reporter failed and neglected to do, and the
defendant, being thus deprived of his right to appeal through no
fault or negligence of his own, sought the relief of equity. The
court, in a well considered opinion, refused the relief on the ground
that there was no claim made that the defendant did not have a
fair and impartial trial, and no facts alleged tending in the least
to show that the verdict of the jury was not the result of a fair
and impartial deliberation upon the evidence submitted. In other
words, there was nothing offered to show that the judgment entered
in the lower court was either unjust or inequitable, or that the
result would be different from that already reached, in the event
that a new trial were granted. There was no concurrence of both
the accident complained of and the injustice of the judgment. The
complainant had not fulfilled his burden of showing that there was
something inherently wrong in the judgment.
The position taken by the court is in accord with the well
settled rule enunciated by a long line of decisions, that where a
judgment is regular on its face, one who seeks to. set it aside or
enjoin its collection must set forth a meritorious defense to the
original action.1 And it is also in accord with the fundamental
principle of equity, that a party seeking its aid must show some
substantial injury. The fraud or accident is, in such cases, a mere
technical wrong, and the aid of equity will not be invoked unless
in addition to the mere technical wrong, a meritorious defense is
shown so that on re-examination and re-trial of the case the result
would .be different.
P.H.R.
MASTER AND SERVANT-AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY TO THIRD
PERSONS--COURSE OR SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT OR AUTHORITY"-
The general use of the automobile has led to a constantly increasing
volume of litigation on causes of action arising out of its use. Not
the least interesting and important class of cases so developed is
that dealing with the owner's liability to persons injured by the
negligent use of motor vehicles by persons other than the owner.
Two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan
furnish excellent examples of this class. In Brhikunan v. Zucker-
"Brandt v. Little, 47 Wash. 194 (19o7), T4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213; Reed
v. N. Y. Nat. Bank, 23o 11. 5o (19o7); Bernhard v. Idaho Bank, 21 Idaho
598 (1912). This rule is universal as to judgments obtained merely by
fraud or accident. In cases where the ground of attack on the judgment is
want of jurisdiction, as where there is no service of summons, there is some
conflict of authority; but the prevailing view is that even there a good de-
fense on the merits must be shown before equity will grant relief. Needle
v. Biddle, 32 R. 1. 342 (1911) ; 6 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., Sec. 667.
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man, the chauffeur drove his owner to a certain place at eight
o'clock in the evening, and was given instructions to return for
his master at twelve. The chauffeur thereupon drove to his father's
residence, a journey of some three miles, remained there for several
hours, and left about a quarter of twelve to keep the appointment
with his employer. On the way in, he picked up three men as pas-
sengers and while driving them to their destination, a little off
the direct route into town, the accident happened. The court held
that the owner was under no liability, as the servant was at the'
time acting for his own benefit and not in the master's business,
hence was not acting within the course or scope of his employment
or authority.IJohnston v. Cornelius presents a slightly different problem, but
one which depends for its solution on the same basic principle.
Here the owner of the car was the father of the driver, a minor,
and not a licensed chauffeur. The boy had been in the habit. of driving
the machine when his father or mother were in it, and even alone
for his- own pleasure, but never without the supervision, consent or
direction of one of his parents, and in fact had positive instiuctions
not to use it except under those conditions. On the night of the
accident the parents had gone out, and, violating instructions, the boy
obtained the car and went for a ride with a young woman acquaint-
ance. When returning home the accident happened. The court held
that the father was not liable, for at the time the boy was not acting
as the servant or agent of the owner, nor did the parental relation,
as such, create the relation of master and servant.
These cases illustrate the application of the general rule that
to hold the owner liable there must be not only the relation of master
and servant between the owner and driver, but he must also act
within the scope of his employment as servant.2 The automobile
is universally accepted as not being of itself a dangerous instru-
mentality, so the law affecting the liability of the owner of a dan-
gerous instrument in the charge of another does not apply.' And,
as stated in Johnston v. Cornelius, the mere fact of family relation-
ship between the owner and driver does not establish the owner's
responsibility. There, as in other cases, the relation of master and
'Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 159 N. W. 316 (Mich. I916); Johnston v. Cor-
nelius, r59 N. W. 318 (Mich. 1gx6).
There must be relation of master and servant before any liability may
even be presumed: Denison v. McNorton, 228 Fed. 4o (1916); Hartley v.
Miller, 165 Mich. 115 (9p) ; Sarver v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 69 (9o7);
Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754 (7908). The driver must be within the
scope of his employment: Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio St. i8 (1913).; Hartley
v. Miller, supra; Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. 339 (i9o7); Neff v. Brandeis, 91
Neb. ir (1912).
*Danforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H. 111 (i9o8) ; Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663
(19o7); Cunningham v. Castle, t27 App. Div. 58o (N. Y. i9o8); Indiana
Springs Co. v. Brown, i6s Ind. 465 (igos).
NOTES
servant or principal-and agent must be shown.4  Very often, in
such cases the determination of the relation is difficult. Many cars
are bought for the pleasure and use of the whole family. But it
is settled that the family relationship itself is not enough. There
must be authority given by the owner, either expressly or impliedly,
or the act must be done for his benefit or under his direction. The
fact that the owner may not receive the benefit directly in such
cases does not destroy the principle nor make it any the less the
use in the owner's business
The phrase "source or scope of the employment or authority,"
when used relative to the acts of a servant means in the service
of his master or while about his master's business.0 This prin-
ciple is easily stated but its application to varying sets of facts is
most difficult and has resulted in confusion and apparent conflict
in the cases, especially so in the automobile cases; hence a deter-
ruination in any particular case must serve as a guide rather than a
positive rule of law. A number of cases illustrative of varying
circumstances and the application to them of the "scope of employ-
ment" rule, are appended.
7
T.L.H.
NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF SPEED LAw-NEGLIGENCE PER
SE-The question of the evidential value of proving the violation
of a "speed law," in establishing the fact of negligence in the con-
duct of a defendant, is simply a branch of the larger problem of
the extent to which proof of violations of any statute or ordinance
may be introduced as evidence of negligence. There are many con-
flicting opinions upon this subject, and the decisions, in many
'Parker v. Wilson, 6o So. i5o (Ala. 1912); Reynolds v. Buck, 127 Iowa
6oz (i9o5); Schumer v. Register, 12 Ga. App. 743 (1913); Loehr v. Abel,
174 Mich. 590 (1913) ; Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95 (93) ; Maher v. Bene-
dict, 123 App. Div. 579 (N. Y. i9o8).
"Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 (I912) ; Marshall v. Taylor, 168 Mo. App.
240 (1913); Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486 .(1913).
'Riley v. Roach, 168 Mich. 294 (i912).
Owner not liable where chauffeur took the car to go to dinner, Steffen
v. McNaughton. 142 Wis. 49 (io); where chauffeur went out on owner's
business, but went some distance out of the way to deliver a note for another
party. Northup v. Robinson. 33 R. . 4Q6 (1912): where chauffeur took a
six-mile trip for his own purposes, Fleishner v. Durgin, 207 Mass. 435 (191) ;
chauffeur entertaining his friends, Symington v. Sipes, 88 Atl. j34 (Md. 1913).
The owner is not liable "Where the servant or chauffeur, although originally
taking the vehicle out for the owner's use, deviates from his owner's business
and goes upon some independent journey for his own or another's pleasure or
benefit." 28 Cyc. 39, and see Provo v. Conrad, 149 N. V. 753 (Minn. 1915),
anotated in 64 UivmsmTy oF PENNSYLVANIA LAw REVIEW, 102; Blaker v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 56 (915), annotated in 64 UrnT.RSiTY oF
PENNSYLVANIA LAw REIEw, 210; and cases cited therein.
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cases, seem to rest upon the peculiar circumstances of the individual
case, rather than upon any fixed principles of law.
Generally speaking, the decisions upon this subject may be
roughly divided into two large sub-divisions: namely, those in which
the violation of a statute or ordinance is deemed negligence per se
-that is, an irrebuttable presumption of- law; and those in which
the violation is regarded as merely prima facie evidence of neg-
ligence, to be considered by the jury, together with all the other
evidence, in determining the fact of negligence.
* Negligence is generally defined as "failure to comply with some
duty imposed by law";1 and if this is the correct definition, it
would seem as an academic proposition, that those decisions which
accept the theory that the violation of a statute is negligence per se
as to those for whose benefit the statute was passed, are more nearly
correct in principle, than those which view such violation as only
prima facic evidence of negligence.
At common law, actions for negligence were predicated upon
the theory that the defendant had been guilty of conduct, either
omissive or commissive, which, as a reasonably prudent man, he
should have avoided. The test as to what constituted a "reasonably
prudent man" was left to the discretion of the jury, who deter-
mined what conduct such a person should, under the circumstances,
have pursued toward the plaintiff, and whether the particular defen-
dant did so conduct himself. If not, he was guilty of negligence.
Now, when the law-making body enjoins certain conduct for the
benefit of one or more classes of people in the community, it thereby
establishes a criterion for determining what should be the conduct
of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances contemplated
by the statute or ordinance. Instead of allowing the jury to deter-
mine by hindsight whether the conduct of the defendant was what
a reasonably prudent man should have done, the legislative body
prescribes, in advance, what shall be the conduct of a reasonably
prudent man under certain circumstances; and if negligence is "a
failure to comply with some duty imposed by law," it would seem,
on theory, that a failure to comply with a duty imposed in advance
by statute or ordinance, would be negligence just as truly as a
failure to comply with a common law duty as interpreted by a
jury after the commission of the act. This is the prevailing view
in the United States ; and the rule is the same with respect both
to statutes enacted by the state, and to ordinances passed by a
municipal corporation.'
'Jones v. American Warehouse Co., 138 N. C. 546 (19o5).
ISt. Louis & Iron Mountain RNwy. v. Taylor, 2io U. S. 281 (I9o8);
Cooper v. B. & 0. R. Co., i59 Fed. Rep. 82 (9o8); Siemers v. Eisen, 4 Cal.
418 (iSgo)- Indiana B. & W. Rwy. Co. v. Barnhart. i 1 d. 399 (1888);
Salisbury v. Herchenroder, io6 Mass. 458 (g 7i) ; Scbaar v. Comfort, 128
Minn. 460 (1915); Beaver v. Mason, Elirnant & Co., 143 Pac. Rep. ooo
(Ok. 1914).
I layes v. Mlich. Cen. R. Co., iii U. S. 237 (1883).
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However, in order for a plaintiff alleging violation of a statute
or ordinance to recover, he must be a member of that class which
the law was enacted to protect; the injury complained of must be
one which the law sought to guard against, and must be the proxi-
mate result of the violation.4  But the fact that the law contains no
express authorization of a civil action for its violation, though it
does prescribe a punishment by fine or imprisonment, will not pre-
vent the party injured from setting up such violation as negligence
per se, if the other essential ingredients of the action are present
5
In such case, however, where no right of civil action is conferred
by the statute, it still retains its characteristics as a common law
action for negligence, in which the defendant's duty toward the plain-
tiff is defined and substituted by the statute in place of what was
formerly his common law duty. It is in no sense an action "on the
statute," or "for breach of the statute."
While the weight of authority seems to be that the vidlation of
such statutes is negligence per sc, as a matter of law, there are a
number of authoritative jurisdictions which maintain the view that
such violation is only prima facie evidence of negligence, subject to
be rebutted by proof that, although the defendant violated the
statute, he was not, in fact, negligent in doing so.7 In such juris-
dictions, the question also arises whether proof of the violation of
the statute is, of itself, sufficient evidence of negligence to war-
rant a verdict for the plaintiff, assuming that the other necessary
elements of a good cause of action are present. The majority
view seems to be that such evidence is, of itself, sufficient to justify
the jury in finding, as a fact, that the defendant was negligent. 8
But in Pennsylvania, at least, such evidence, though competent to
be considered by the jury together with other evidence of negli-
gence, is not, of itself, sufficient to warrant a finding that the defen-
dant was negligent.9
Laws regulating the speed of vehicles are undoubtedly passed
to protect persons and property along and upon the highway from
injury which is liable to result to them from excessive speed of
"Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., go Kan. 51 (T9r3) ; Chicago, R. I.
& P. Rwy. Co. v. Pitchford, 143 Pac. Rep. x46 (OkI. xg4).
'Schell v. Du Bois, 113 N. E. 664 (Ohio x916).
'Evers v. Davis, 86 N. J. L. 196 (iqz4).
'Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331 (19g5); Burbank v.
Bethel Steam Mill Co., 75 Me. 373 (1883); Scott v. Dow, 162 Mich. 636
(igio) ; McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222 (x889) ; and see the curious de-
cision in Willette v. Rhinelander Paper Co., 145 Wis. 537 (i9xi), where it
was said that breach of a statute is "negligence per se, as matter of fact, re-
buttable by proof to the contrary."
'U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg. 211 Il. ..31 (94): Blickley v.
Luce's Estate, 148 fich. 233 (i9o7); McRichard v. Flint, supra, note 7. '
•Ubelmann v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398 (79o4); Riegert v. Thack-
ery, 212 Pa. 86 (igoS).
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such vehicles. It is therefore apparent that, whether or not the
violation of a speed law is deemed negligence per se, will depend
upon the view which the courts of a particular jurisdiction have
taken with respect to the violations of similar statutes and ordi-"
nances, and such decisions as there are in point, support this
view. 0
There is, however, an exception to the general rule which
should be noted. It is agreed in practically all of the recent deci-
sions that the violation of a statute requiring all persons driving
along the highway to keep to the right, is not negligence per se,
if the offender can show that what he did was a necessary choice
of hazards in an emergency. But unless he can establish that
fact affirmatively, the usual rule applies."'
PROPERTY-I'ILLS-CONSTRUCTION OF WORD "ISSUE" IN
BEQUESTS-The construction of the word "issue" can hardly be
said to raise a novel question at this time, but it is one that the
courts are called on to answer daily. The difficulty lies in the fact,
that the word in the abstract embodies two meanings-a vulgar and
a legal one. In the former sense it is commonly used to-denote
immediate offspring; in the latter, it may include lineal descendants
beyond the first generation.' This latter idea of the word had its
origin in the necessity of so taking it in connection with devises of
real estate to one for life, then to the issue, in order to make it
a word of limitation rather than one of purchase.2 The legal mean-
ing was then applied to the word regardless of the character of
the property, in the absence of controlling words to the contrary
in the ,will itself.' But in cases relating to personal property, the
English courts began, early in the nineteenth century, to show a
tendency to break away from the stricter rule if possible; and to
do this they naturally resorted to the expedient of limiting the
word "issue" by other words used in connection with it by the
testtor-in short, to decide as nearly as possible, what was the
intention of the testator in that particular instance. The landmark
'Schell v. Du Bois, supra, note 5. See also Thompson's Commentaries
on Negligence, Vols. i and 8, Sec. 1o.
" Borg v. Larson, 'xi N. E. 216 (Ind. ixgs); Johnson v. Heitman, 88
Wash. s95 (x15).
2 Hawkshead, Operation in Wills of the word "issue," p. 417.
2 Roe v. Grew, 2 Wils. 322 (Eng. j767) ; Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh x (Eng.
1820).
I In Jesson v. Wright, supra, Lord Redesdale says: "The rule is, that tech-
nical words shall have their legal effect, unless, from subsequent inconsistent
words, it is very clear that the testator meant otherwise."
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in this line of cases is Sibley v. Perry,' where the word was used
in connection with "parent," and the court restricted it to the vul-
gar meaning.5 Despite this seeming predilection that grew up, for
restricting the import to "children," ' there is little doubt that prima
facie it is generally held to be synonymous with "descendants."'
This construction of the word has not gone unchallenged, how-
ever, and in America, especially, there seems to be some little
tendency to adopt wholly the common interpretation of the word
when applied to personalty. So great an authority as Chancellor
Kent,8 seems to have looked with disfavor on the legal definition;
and cases which have referred to his opinion, have laid even greater
emphasis on his views than their exposition in his Commentaries
seen to warrant. Indeed, in New York, it was at one time ex-
pressly stated that "issue". ordinarily was to be considered co-
terminous with "children."0  The importance of the cases taking
this view, is practically negatived, however, by the fact that a
slightly earlier case 1o in the Court of Appeal of that State, recog-
nized the English rule, and was misinterpreted by the later cases.
Aside from the difficulties based on the two meanings of
"issue," there are several instances where its use raises a further
question as to what persons are included. As in the case of a
reference to "children," "issue" prinma facie means "legitimate
'7 Ves. Jr. 522 (Eng. 18o2).
' Lord Eldon, in Sibley v. Perry, supra, laid the foundation for the rule
that where the parent of an issue is spoken of, the prima facie meaning of
"issue" becomes restricted to "children." This doctrine was strengthened by
the later case of Pruen v. Osborne, ii Sim. 132 (Eng. i84o)-in fact, the latter
is often treated as the better authority.
" This is well illustrated in a recent English case-Re Timson, ii5 LAw
TimEs 55 (1916). There an income was left to A for life, and on his death to
his children; if he had none, it was to be divided among five other nephews
and nieces of the testator, and if any or all of them should have died in the
lifetime of A, "leaving lawful issue, then such issue shall take the share or
shares which his, her or their parents would have taken." A had no children,
and it became necessary for the court to construe "issue." It was held that
it was so closely connected with "parents" as to be restricted to the common
meaning of "children." Yet, as far as the logic of allowing one word thus to
change the meaning of another, a comparatively recent American case, Jackson
v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374 (iSgz), in holding to the legal definition, intimated
that there was no more reason for allowing "parents" to change the meaning
of "issue" than the reverse.
'Davenport v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. Jr. 257 (Eng. 1796); Ross v. Ross, 2o
Beav. 645 (Eng. 1855) ; Re Embury, log LAw TIMES 511 (Eng. 1913) ; Appeal
of Miller, 52 Pa. 113 (r866) ; Pearce v. Rickard, 18 R. I. r42 (1893) ; 2 Jar-
man, Wills (6th Ed.), p. 1590; 2 Redfield, Wills (2d Ed.), p. 355 et seq.;
Ward, Legacies, p. O7; i Williams, Executors (ioth Ed.), p. 870.
4 Kent, Commentaries, p. 278n.
'Murray v. Bronson, i Dem. Sur. 217 (N. Y. 7883) ; Taft v. Taft, 3 Dem.
Sur. 86 (N. Y. z885).
" Palmer v. Horn, 84 N. Y. 5t6 (I881).
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issue." 12 But the children of a legitimatized daughter of a legatee,
have been allowed to take under the description of "lawful issue"
of that legatee 2"-thus departing from the prima facie meaning
as to legitimacy, and holding to it as to general scope. Another
point on which there is a distinct split of authority, is whether or
not "issue" includes an adopted child. By a logical analysis of the
common meaning of "issue" as offspring, an adopted child could
not come under such a description. 3 But when one considers that
by adoption a child is enabled to inherit, by reason of statutory
wording, the courts taking the opposite view, seem to hold a sounder,
and, on the whole, a more just position."' Perhaps the most inter-
esting phase of the general topic, is centered on this point: Who is
included by the words "male issue"? The question can only arise
when the person attempting to qualify under that description, is
in at least the second generation from the testator. Does it include
a son of the testator's daughter, or must the descent be by the
male line throughout? The probable weight of authority" seems
to favor the latter view through analogy to such a restriction in
real estate. The reasoning of the opposite view, however, is more
logicAl. A daughter's son certainly fits in with the words used to
the fullest extent; there is no need for restricting to the male line
as was often the case with realty in early times; and, when relating
to personalty, the words are generally used as words of purchase."
Not the least of the difficulties raised by this word, occurs
when it is used more than once in a will. Sometimes there will
be such a connection that there can be no doubt that it has the same
meaning throughout. But where there are a number of separate
clauses, it is a different matter. It is now generally admitted, how-
ever, that if used in what the court considers its vulgar sense, in
all but one clause, and in that one it does not clearly appear which
meaning it has, then it must be given the meaning of "children" in
all the clauses." Indeed some authorities go so far as to hold that
"Cartwright v. Vawdry 5 Ves. Jr. 530 (Eng. x8oo) ; Gibson v. McNeely,
ii Ohio St. 131 (x86o); Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 18z (x895).
Appeal of Miller, supra.
IN. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. i i (899).
"6Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346 (i879); Hartwell v. Tefft, ig R. I. 644
(1896).
ILywood v. Kimber. 2 9 Beav. 38 (Eng. ixS6o); Hawkins, Wills (2d
Ed.), p. 211; Theobald, Wills (5th.Ed.), p. 302.
" Wistar v. Scott, io5 Pa. 20o 0884) ; Wistar v. Gillilan, 4 At. 8t5 (Pa.
x886): Beckman v. De Saussure, 9 S. Car. 531 (x8Z6) ; 2 Jarman, Wills (6th
Am. Ed.), p. 913*.
"Re Birks, L R. i Ch. Div. 417 (1 ng. 0goo) ; Duckett's Estate, 214 Pa.
362 (1906).
"Ridgeway v. Munkittrick, x Dr. & War. 84 (Eng. 784t); I Williams,
Executors (xoth Ed.), p. 835.
NOTES
it must always have the same meaning throughout.18 But this seems
doubtful unless understood to include an exception when the testa-
tor puts in words strictly to the contrary.19
From this brief survey, some of the difficulties attendant on
this word, can be appreciated. Whether the courts will ever wholly
remove the difficulty by disregarding the legal meaning, when con-
cerned with personalty, is doubtful. That they should do this seems
to be the consensus of opinion to be gathered from the many cases
where they have avoided the technical meaning by special interpre-
tation. As the modern tendency of the law is to simplify legal
proceedings as much as possible, this would be but a step in that
direction-for to the person unacquainted with the law, "issue"
connotes "children" rather than "descendants." One of thV leading
authorities on the Law of Wills, 20 thinks that the later English
cases show a disposition to get away from the idea that "issue" is
synonymous with "descendants"; and speaks with approbation of
Chancellor Kent's view. But the double meaning has existed so
long, that it is likely to continue until abolished by legislatures rather
than by judicial interpretation. R.T.B.
21Re Birks, supra; Theobald, Wills (5th Ed.), p. 292.
2 Redfield, Wills (2d Ed.), p. 358.
